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COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE :E°EDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM. By J.
Woodford Howard, Jr. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
1981. Pp. xxvi, 415. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $12.50.

Circuit courts of appeals occupy a relatively obscure position in
the federal judicial hierarchy. Lacking the immediacy of the ninetyfive district courts and the visible omnipotence of the Supreme
Court, circuit courts, until recently, have received only cursory attention in the legal literature. Over the past decade, however, analysts
have begun to acknowledge the significance of these intermediate
appellate tribunals; moreover, some of the more enlightened commentaries have presented the circuits as integral components of the
federal legal system. 1
J. Woodford Howard, Jr.'s timely study, Courts ofAppeals in the
' 9. In the chapter on judicial restraints, Neely only mentions that courts are asked to solve
problems today that would not have been brought to courts twenty years ago. P. 202. This
indirect reference is used to illustrate the increase in the judicial workload; Neely does not
consider how this increase in workload undercuts his proposed restraints.
10. In his analysis of the judicial balancing function, Neely implicitly assumes that courts
can decide when to intervene. Horowitz, in an empirical study, concluded that courts are particularly unfit to make this threshold intervention decision. Horowitz found courts poorly
suited to judge the consequences of policy-making, hence poorly suited to decide when to
intervene. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 257-97 (1977).
Neely also overlooks the views of others in his analysis of restraints on the judiciary. Professor Choper notes that the basic restraints on the Supreme Court are impeachment and constitutional amendment. Neither of these restraints looms large as a practical matter. Because
of this lack of external restraints, the Supreme Court at times has held to positions that are
highly unpopular. J. CHOPER, supra note I, at 47-55.
Others have disagreed with Choper and Horowitz. See Chayes, supra note I, at 1307-09;
McGowan, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REV. 616 (1981). Neely, however, does not attempt to
refute their arguments.

I. See, e.g., s. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM
{2d ed. 1976); R. RICHARDSON & K. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS (1970); G.
SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING (rev. ed. 1974).
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Federal Judicial System, supplements the existing literature with an
exhaustive investigation of the effects of the recent litigation explosion2 on three leading circuits. 3 Interestingly, Howard is concerned
· not only with ''the business and functions of the three major tribunals in the flow of federal litigation," but also with "the attitudes of
the judges toward their job and its chief problems" (p. xvii). These
concerns led him to augment the detailed information that he and
his assistants compiled on thousands of cases over a three-year period with insights gleaned from interviews with a number of circuit
judges. Although these interviews lend a personal touch, and at
times even produce a chuckle, Howard, like his predecessors, resorts
to rigorous systems analysis. Consequently, readers who feel at ease
with the technical jargon commonly used by political scientists will
find Courts ofAppeals relevant and enlightening. Readers who lack
a strong background in the social sciences, however, must master the
book's appendices before undertaking the yeoman task of deciphering Howard's incessant stream of data.4
In an attempt to impose a sense of order on his voluminous research, Howard initially poses two questions: (1) What binds federal
courts into a judicial system? and (2) What controls the personal discretion of circuit judges as they make law and policy in the course of
adjudication? Howard uses the answers to these inquiries to test various proposals for alleviating the pressures imposed by an expanding
caseload.
Courts ofAppeals consists of three parts. In Part I, Howard assesses the formal constraints5 on judicial decision-making. In theory, the possibility of reversal by the Supreme Court should
significantly restrict the exercise of discretion by circuit judges. But
the Court's capacity to review lower court decisions is quite limited.6
Since the Justices can review only a few cases, Howard finds, circuit
courts usually dictate the final outcome. This freedom of the circuit
judges to make policy, in Howard's view, promotes autonomy and
2. Between 1961 and 1978, the number of cases brought in the circuit courts roughly quadrupled. P. 10.
3. Because of time and financial constraints, Professor Howard limited his study to the
Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits. He chose these tribunals on the basis of
significance, convenience, and variety. P. xix.
4. Howard prefaces the book with a warning: "Because the analysis draws upon social
concepts that may be unfamiliar to some readers, the basic conceptions and limitations of the
research design should be understood from the start. (Further details regarding methodology
appear in Appendix 1.)" Pp. xviii-xiv.
5. Throughout the book, Howard distinguishes between formal and informal constraints.
Formal constraints include those procedural mechanisms built into the federal judicial system
(i.e., Supreme Court review, rehearings en bane, and panel rotation). Informal constraints
embrace the relatively subtle notions of shared judicial norms, a common sense of purpose,
and complementary political and professional values.
6. From 1965 to 1967, the Supreme Court heard only 1.9% of all circuit court cases; furthermore, the Justices reversed only two thirds of the decisions that they heard. Pp. 57-58.
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heterogeneity. He concludes, therefore, that the specter of Supreme
Court review does not, by itself, bind the intermediate federal courts
into a judicial system (p. 84).
Although the statistics on Supreme Court review appear to support Howard's appraisal, he probably underestimates the overall effectiveness of formal constraints. Actual review by the Supreme
Court is only one of the formal constraints on the discretion of circuit court judges. Howard asserts only that the Court cannot directly
oversee the circuit courts; he fails to give due consideration to other,
less hierarchical controls. The doctrine of stare decisis, for example,
lends stability to the process of adjudication. Circuit judges do, of
course, have some leeway to make policy, but they must work within
the boundaries established by judicial precedent.
The answers to Howard's initial inquiries unfold in Part II as he
shifts his attention to the circuit judges themselves and to the informal constraints that help form their consensus. Howard cites three
processes that tend to filter judges of like character into appellate
tribunals (pp. 89-120). First, the recruitment procedure weeds out
incompetents and political extremists and draws upon accomplished
jurists of middle-class means and moderate political convictions.
Next, the socialization of circuit court judges - training that occurs
primarily before their promotion to the bench - prompts a further
convergence of ideological values. Finally, the process of professionalization gives rise to common judicial norms. Through long
years of legal training - education, private practice, teaching, and
adjudication - circuit judges acquire similar professional values.
Ultimately, Howard :finds, they share a sense of purpose. 7
These three filtering processes, Howard maintains, promote consensus in judicial decision-making. 8 A shared conception of duty,
spawned by complementary political and professional values, sustains both unity and uniformity. Informal, rather than formal constraints, therefore, provide the glue that binds the diverse elements of
the federal court system. Succinctly summarized, Howard's :final position is that " 'men count more than machinery' " (p. 124).
Howard makes his principal contribution to the legal literature in
Part III. Perhaps the most pressing problem facing the courts of appeals today is their ever-increasing caseloads. In Part III, Howard
discusses a number of proposals for mitigating the damage caused by
this phenomenon (pp. 269-89). These include increasing the number
of judges and circuits, realigning the existing judicial districts to balance limited resources, streamlining management to promote effi7. According to Howard, ''.judges were united by a common understanding that the central
mission of circuit courts is to adjudicate appeals as agents of the national government." P. 156.
8. But see p. 204 (referring to the "bitter'' and "acerbic" conflicts between various circuit
court judges).
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cient adjudication, and diverting certain types of cases to less
congested and better-suited tribunals.
Howard criticizes each proposal in tum. Because of the system's
sensitive nature, he warns, ill-considered solutions will cause widespread harm and may upset the consensual basis for decisions. Adding more judges, for example, could make en bane proceedings
unmanageable; alternatively, increasing the number of circuits might
aggravate regionalism and intercircuit conflicts. Geographic realignment raises similar provincial difficulties and, in any event, offers
only limited potential for improvement. Better management would
increase efficiency but it would exact a high price in terms of judicial
flexibility and personalized attention. Finally, Howard faults diversion because it would restrict access to the federal courts.
Once again, Howard's criticisms are partly unwarranted. If, as
he suggests, men count more than machinery, then the system's survival primarily depends on the informal norms that influence judicial decision-making. As long as the existing means of recruitment,
socialization, and professionalization are preserved, the federal circuit courts can accommodate the structural alterations that these reforms would entail. The system, in fact, has already demonstrated
its resilience by enduring the addition of new judgeships9 and the
partition of the Fifth Circuit. Despite Howard's premonitions, it
should survive similar changes in the future.
On the whole, however, Courts ofAppeals deserves more praise
than criticism. Howard does not pretend to offer a panacea for the
chronic afflictions of the federal circuit courts. He merely seeks to
discuss the ramifications of potential changes before the litigation
explosion compels hasty action. From this perspective, the best
measure of the book's success may well be the fruitfulness of the
further debate that it is almost certain to trigger. 10

9. In 1978, Congress increased the number of circuit judgeships from 97 to 132. 28 U.S.C.
§ 44(a) (Supp. II 1978).

10. Howard's book has also been reviewed by Sbarboro, Book Review, 67 A.B.A. J. 1168
(1981); Whiteman, Book Review, 106 LIB. J. 466 (1981).

